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Abstract: 
 
Productivity growth has long been associated with, among others, contestability of 
markets which, in turn, is dependent on the ease with which potential competitors to the 
incumbent firms can enter the product market. There is a growing consensus that in 
emerging markets regulatory and institutional factors may have a greater influence on a 
firm’s ability to enter a product market than strategic positions adopted by the incumbent 
firms. We examine this proposition in the context of India where the industrial policies of 
the eighties and the nineties are widely believed to be pro-incumbent and pro-
competition, respectively, thereby providing the setting for a natural experiment with 
1991 as the watershed year. In our analysis, we also take into consideration the possibility 
that the greater economic federalism associated with the reforms of the nineties may have 
affected the distribution of industrial units across states after 1991. Our paper, which uses 
the experiences of the textiles and electrical machinery sectors during the two decades as 
the basis for the analysis, finds broad support for both these hypotheses. 
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1. Introduction 
The popular wisdom about India’s reforms process is that it was initiated in 1991, in the 
aftermath of a severe balance of payments crisis. However, two recent papers (Rodrik 
and Subramanian, 2004; Virmani, 2004) argue that the structural change in India was 
more pronounced in the eighties than in the nineties. Using aggregate data for the Indian 
economy, they make the case that the data for the nineties do not support the hypothesis 
that the reform process that started in 1991, and has been carried out since then, has 
resulted in a sharp break from the past. Rodrik and Subramanian (2004) go on to suggest 
that the decade of the eighties was characterised by a pro-incumbent business policy 
while the nineties was a more pro-entrant policy.  
 
Since the facilitation of contestability of markets, of which entry is an important 
ingredient, is considered to be an integral part of structural reforms, the Rodrik and 
Subramanian argument has important implications for the relative impact of reforms on 
productivity and efficiency of the Indian industries during the two decades. Ceteris 
paribus, pro-incumbent industrial policies of the eighties should have stymied 
productivity growth, while pro-competition policies of the nineties should have 
stimulated it. In this paper, we do not address the empirical question involving the 
relationship between entry and productivity. Rather, we examine India’s industrial policy 
changes that were introduced during the eighties and the nineties, and the impact of these 
changes on firm entry in India’s manufacturing sector.  
 
Starting from the fifties, the Indian government had taken an approach of directing the 
process of industrialization to suit the path of development envisaged in the various 5-
year Plans. The implementation of the industrial strategies primarily involved the use of 
two policy instruments. First, the government reserved a number of industrial sectors for 
state-owned companies alone. Second, though private firms were allowed to operate in 
other sectors, all industrial units had to take the central government’s permission before 
being set up. Such licenses were given in accordance with the macro-economic plan 
targets and with a view to balancing out regional disparities in industrialization.  
   2
Over the years, the government added to these basic instruments of industrial policy other 
initiatives like import substitution, non-tariff barriers against consumer goods imports, 
and reservation of some industries for the small scale sector. Many of the policy 
initiatives that restricted the independent decision making ability of the Indian private 
sector were taken in the seventies. For example, a 1973 resolution restricted the business 
houses, defined as those with combined assets of more than INR 200 million, to specific 
sectors in the economy. This was supplemented in 1977 by a list of over 800 items that 
were reserved for production in the small scale sector (investment in plant and machinery 
not exceeding INR 1 million). In addition, all new capacity expansion by existing 
companies had to be sanctioned by the government and such expansions were usually 
disallowed if the market share in any product was more than 25 per cent. All of these 
severely restricted the ability of the private sector to benefit from economies of scale and 
scope. 
 
In 1980, the architect of much of the socialist policies of the seventies, Indira Gandhi, 
came back as Prime Minister after being out of power for three years. An important 
lesson that she had learnt from her election defeat of 1977 was that it was important to 
have business people on her side (Kohli, 2004). Arguably, her short and turbulent 
political reign during the early eighties witnessed some rethinking about the socialist 
industrial policies that had been unleashed in India over the previous three decades. Her 
son, Rajiv Gandhi, who succeeded her as Prime Minister after her assassination in 1984, 
had stronger belief in the role of the private sector and market economy in fostering 
industrialization and economic growth. He was in power until 1989, and, as argued by 
Rodrik and Subramanian, the first set of economic reforms was initiated under his 
stewardship. In 1989, he lost power to a coalition government, which was in principle 
opposed to most of his economic policies and wanted to directly concentrate on social 
justice and equity, rather than use economic growth as a means to that end. However, the 
coalition was inherently unstable, and by 1991 the Congress Party returned to power. 
However, in the interim, Rajiv Gandhi had also been assassinated.  
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The first major economic challenge of the new Congress government was a severe 
balance of payments crisis in 1991, highlighting not only the macroeconomic imbalances 
facing the Indian economy, but also the need for structural reforms. The government of 
Narasimha Rao capitalized on the macroeconomic crisis to initiate a rash of reforms that 
are well documented in the literature (see, e.g., Parikh, 1997). Since 1991, state 
monopolies in industries have been dismantled, tariff and non-tariff barriers to imports 
have been reduced or eliminated, financial markets have been liberalized, and foreign 
direct investment have been allowed in nearly all sectors. While the pace of reforms has 
been uneven, and has varied in accordance with political compulsions, there is no 
disagreement in the Indian polity (nor among policymakers) about the need for and the 
nature of the reforms per se. 
 
In this paper, we examine two hypotheses, namely, that (a la Rodrik and Subramanian) 
reforms were pro-incumbent in the eighties and pro-competition (or pro-entrant) in the 
nineties, and that, as a consequence of economic decentralization, state-level factors 
affected performance, and, hence location decisions, of firms/plants more in the nineties 
than in the eighties. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we outline 
the main characteristics of the reforms pursued during the two decades, with emphasis on 
reforms that influenced industrial policy. In Section 3, we examine the impact of these 
policies on overall net entry rates and the impact of entry, using data for 3-digit industries 
as well as plant level data for 1989-90 and 2000-01. The experiences of the textiles and 
electrical machinery industries are explored in Sections 4 and 5. In Section 6, we examine 
the relative importance of state-level factors in influencing plant-level performance 
during the eighties and the nineties. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Two decades of reforms 
The pro-incumbent nature of the policy regime of the eighties was evident in a number of 
policy initiatives. The industrial policy resolution of 1980 emphasized the need for 
improving productivity in existing units and in order to make them globally competitive. 
The role of scale economies in the private sector, both in terms of new technologies and 
cost-effective organizational structures, was recognized for the first time since   4
Independence. In keeping with the new vision of industrial development, in 1980, a 
business house was redefined as one whose combined assets exceeded INR 1 billion, i.e., 
five times the limit of INR 200 million set in 1973. This meant that all firms with assets 
between INR 200 million and 1 billion could operate in sectors in which they were not 
allowed entry prior to 1980. Second, business houses were allowed to operate outside 
their permitted list of sectors if they set up factories in economically backward areas. 
Third, existing units could set up new units, without restriction on size, provided the 
latter were 100 per cent export oriented. Fourth, access to foreign technology, hitherto 
severely restricted, was allowed if it resulted in either exports growth or significant 
improvement in cost structures of the firms. Fifth, the upper limit for capital stock used 
for defining the small scale sector was increased from INR 1 to 2 million. (The limit for 
ancillary units was increased to INR 2.5 million from the earlier 1.5 million.)  
 
In addition to such industrial policies, a fiscal policy initiative was introduced in the mid-
eighties to encourage firms to undertake long-term investment plans. Duties on project 
related imports were reduced, along with those on all other capital goods. At the same 
time, import duties on final goods continued to be high. While all these were favourable 
to existing companies, status quo was maintained with respect to the licensing procedure 
for most new entrants. In other words, incumbent firms were able to reduce cost of 
production and, at the same time, extract rent in markets that were protected from import 
competition. Further, while both incumbent and new firms required licenses, for capacity 
expansion and production, respectively, the former were at an advantage on account of 
their continuing relationship with the government bureaucracy. As a consequence, the 
licensing process (and the playing field, in general) was heavily loaded in favour of 
incumbents (Bhagwati, 1982, 1988).  
 
In the early eighties, some sectors were delicensed, and this process was slightly 
modified in the mid-eighties. However, a more important initiative was that of broad-
banding. Originally, a license was given for a specific product. This meant that a 
producer of two-wheelers, for example, who had a license for scooters, could not produce 
motor-cycle, without seeking a licence. However, with broad-banding, expansion of   5
business into related areas became possible. This, once again, gave a boost to product 
development as well as economies of scope and scale. However, with the licensing 
requirement for new entrants still in place, broad-banding gave a clear advantage to the 
incumbent firms. 
 
An important new law was enacted in the second half of the eighties: the Sick Industrial 
Companies (Special Provisions) Act, or SICA, of 1985. Under this Act, a bankruptcy 
court, named the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR), was set up in 
1987. Under the SICA, any company that has been registered for more than 7 years and 
whose net worth has been eroded significantly must apply to BIFR for permission for 
closure. There are three important aspects to this law. First, small units were kept outside 
the purview of the law. Second, the application was mandatory and not voluntary as in 
the US Chapter 11 bankruptcy code. Third, since application to BIFR was mandatory, 
creditors could not attach and liquidate assets of the defaulting companies. According to 
the Act, closure of an industrial unit was considered to be a social loss and, hence, this 
outcome was to be avoided wherever possible. In order to facilitate operation of the sick 
industrial units, government owned banks and financial institutions provided credit at 
subsidized interest rates. Further, and not surprisingly, all capacity and licensing 
restrictions were suspended if a healthy company merged with a sick one under the 
supervision of BIFR. Since the managers did not face any cost of bankruptcy, there were 
strong incentives to overlook impending financial distress (Gangopadhyay and Knopf, 
1998), and facilitated the creation of non-performing assets on the balance sheets of the 
banks (Bhaumik and Mukherjee, 2002). Once again, it skewed the playing field against 
potential entrants; capital was tied up in loss-making industrial units instead of being 
delivered to new units of production. 
 
By contrast, the post-1991 reforms laid strong emphases on enabling markets and 
globalization coupled with lower degrees of direct government involvement in economic 
activities. The focus was mainly on five areas: foreign investment, entry procedures, 
technology, monopolies and restrictive trade practices (MRTP Act), and the public sector. 
Quite significantly, the first policy announcement of the reform process was the abolition   6
of licenses. For the first time in post-Independence India, licensing requirements for all 
projects were abolished; only those related to defence or potentially environment-
damaging industries needed prior permission.
1 As of 1991, an entrepreneur only has to 
file an information memorandum on new projects and/or for substantial capacity 
expansions. Further, the MRTP Act was amended such that the need for approval from 
the central government for establishing a new plant, capacity expansion, merger, takeover 
and directors’ appointments (in the private sector) was abolished. 
 
The nineties’ reforms also encouraged technology adoption and greater participation of 
foreign companies in the Indian industrial sector. Until 1991, foreign ownership of equity 
was restricted to less than 40 per cent in all sectors, and FDI was completely disallowed 
in many of these sectors. In 1991, foreign direct investment up to 51 per cent equity was 
allowed in some of the sectors, and, over the next fourteen years, there has been a 
significant relaxation of the rules governing FDI across the board (see Beena et al., 
2004). By the end of the nineties, most manufacturing units in the SEZs
2 were allowed 
100 per cent FDI under automatic approval. Further, the “dividend balancing” 
requirement on 22 consumer goods industry was removed.
3 Procedures for the 
procurement of technology from abroad were also simplified, largely by way of 
facilitation of ways for payment of patent-related royalties. The high priority industries 
were given automatic permission for technology transfer.  
 
The nineties also witnessed the operationalisation of the long-debated policy initiatives 
on the role of the public sector within the country’s industrial structure. Until the end of 
the eighties, prices of most infrastructure and basic intermediates were controlled by the 
government on a cost-plus basis, under the aegis of the administered price regime (APR). 
                                                 
1  By the end of 1997-98, all but 9 industries had been delicensed.  
2 The following items were excluded: arms and ammunition, explosives and allied items 
of defence equipment, defence aircraft and warships; atomic substances; narcotics and 
psychotropic substances and hazardous chemicals; distillation and brewing of alcoholic 
drinks; and cigarettes/cigars and manufactured tobacco substitutes. 
3 Dividend balancing required that a foreign investor plough back its dividends and/or 
royalty from an Indian operation into the same operation for a stipulated number of years.   7
This led to allocative inefficiencies and, at the same time, created conditions of supply 
shortages, as administered prices typically failed to clear the market. In the context of 
these supply shortages, it was easier for incumbent companies with existing supply 
chains and government contacts to procure the rationed supply of intermediate products. 
In the nineties, the APR was abandoned, and the list of industries reserved for the public 
sector was reduced from 17 to 8. In 1993-94, the list of sectors reserved for the public 
sector was further reduced to 6. State monopolies in insurance, civil aviation, 
telecommunication and petroleum were abandoned, and the private sector was allowed 
participation in these sectors. In effect, entry barriers for the Indian industrial sector had 
been further removed. 
 
It is evident that while changes to industrial policies were afoot since the eighties, the 
reforms of the nineties were more favourable to entrepreneurship development, and hence 
entry, compared to the eighties. While both sets of reforms were more pro-industry 
compared to what has been happening since Independence, the eighties’ reforms were 
directed more at increasing the profitability of existing companies without reducing the 
barriers to entry faced by potential entrants. The obvious question to ask, therefore, is 
how the two different policy regimes impacted the actual entry and investment decisions 
of companies during the two decades. 
 
Before taking a closer look at the data, and the experience of specific Indian industries 
during the two decades, we have to take cognizance of the key difference between 
industrial policymaking between these decades. Since the purpose of licensing was to 
achieve macro-balance and targets set by the 5-year Plans, these permissions were 
handed out by the central government and not by the state governments. Indeed, the 
Centre exercised complete control over industries prior to the nineties in a number of 
other ways. For example, foreign exchange and its control was a prerogative of the 
central government and all foreign currency transactions were closely monitored and 
severely restricted through the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA). One major 
implication of the reforms carried out in the nineties was that the control of the central 
government over the process and pattern of industrialization waned and, at the same time,   8
states started playing a much larger role in their own industrialization. While the central 
government continued to have control over environmental policies, labour policies, and 
bankruptcy procedures, the implementation of the associated laws and regulations was 
passed on to the states, thereby according the states significant discretionary powers over 
the industrial sector. Hence, in addition to the characterization of the eighties as pro-
incumbent and the nineties as pro-entrant, we will also have to take into account the 
impact of the greater federalism in industrial decisions in the nineties. 
 
An important aspect of this federalism in economic policy is the competition among 
different policy approaches. In a centralized economic system, there is very little scope 
for competitive experiments in policy. The only competition faced by a centrally 
controlled policy regime is from the approaches followed by other nations. In the case of 
India, this would have come from Japan and the Gang of Four in the early stages and 
from the Asian tigers in more recent years. However, if a country follows an explicit 
import substitution strategy, and is not keen to entice FDI, much of the discussion about 
inter-country competition within the policy space is moot. But if the policy regime within 
a country is federal in nature, states acting within the same macro-spectrum could 
experiment with different sets of industrial policies. The more progressive states could, in 
principle, become role models for the other states. Thus, the greater freedom to states to 
decide on their respective economic package of reforms and their implementation (i.e., 
quality of governance), can be viewed as an opportunity to the states that seek reforms. 
This possibility for states to embark on different, and potentially competing, reform paths 
was a significant difference between the pre- and post-nineties policy regimes.
4 There is 
prima facie evidence to suggest that, in post-1991 India, there was inter-state variation in 
the degree of accountability of the state governments (Besley and Burgess, 2004), such 
accountability being the basis for the quality of governance and the associated economic 
                                                 
4  This is similar to the postulates of Djankov, La Porta, Silanes and Shleifer (2002), Klapper, 
Laeven and Rajan (2004) and Perotti and Volpin (2004) which suggest that institutional factors 
like political structure (e.g., democracy) and legal origin (e.g., common law), as well as 
governance (e.g., protection of property rights) have significant impact on cross-country 
variations in net entry rates.   9
policies that benefit the process of industrialization and, thereby, the wider economic 
stakeholders (e.g., labor) living in the state. 
 
3. Net growth of factories  
In this section, we use the data from the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) to investigate 
the pattern of entry of new factories into industries, and the pattern of location of the new 
industrial units across the Indian states. We use two types of ASI data for our analyses: 
the 3-digit industry level data, and the more disaggregated factory level data. We cannot 
identify new entrants and exiting firms at the industry level, and hence we cannot analyse 
the impact of policy changes and federalization of economic policy on gross entry and 
gross exit rates. However, we are able to estimate net entry rates for 3-digit industries 
across the years. While the industry level data are available from 1973-74, the factory 
level data are available for 1989-90 and for 2000-01, the end-points of the two decades. 
Since the classification of industries was changed post 1997-98, and given that it is 
difficult to get a direct correspondence between pre- and post-1997-98 industries at the 3-
digit level, our analysis involving the 3-digit industry level data ends in 1997-98.  
 
To begin with, we use the plant-level data for 1989-90 and 2000-01 to confirm the 
hypothesis that the reforms were pro-incumbent during the eighties and pro-competition 
(or pro-entrant) in the nineties. Economic theory suggests that a pro-incumbent regime 
that facilitates rent-seeking by the incumbent firms, and also facilitate the continuation of 
operation of weaker firms, will necessarily lead to a more dispersed distribution of 
profits. Some of the firms/plants in a pro-incumbent regime will earn super-normal 
profits, while others will continue to be in business despite being unprofitable. A pro-
entrant (or pro-competition) regime, on the other hand, will result in profits being 
clustered around zero; fewer firms will earn super-normal profits, and fewer unprofitable 
firms will continue to operate. These expected patterns of profit distribution are reflected 
in the two frames of Figure 2; profits during 1989-90 were much more dispersed than 
during 2000-01.  
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Figure 1 
Inferring Extent of Competition from Distribution of Firm-Level Profits 
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Let us now return to the issue of entry itself. Ideally, for a comparison of the eighties and 
the nineties, one should look at the birth and death of companies in the two decades. 
While the persistence of SICA through 1997-98 implies that exit rates may not differ 
significantly between the eighties and the nineties, entry can be expected to be higher 
during the pro-entrant nineties than during the pro-incumbent eighties. While it is entirely 
possible that an increase in the number of factories reflects capacity expansion by 
incumbent firms, as opposed to entry by new firms, it could, nevertheless, be instructive 
to study industrial churning in the two decades by looking at the growth of new 
factories.
5 Further, given the plausible assumption that new industrial units reflect use of 
new innovations and technologies, irrespective of whether the new plant is owned by an 
incumbent or a new entrant, it might be worthwhile examining both forms of entry. 
Finally, it is instructive to recall that until 1991 licenses were required for both capacity 
expansion and setting up of new factories. 
 
Before examining the data, it is important to identify two specific political events that 
occurred during the eighties and the nineties. In January of 1982, India witnessed the 
initiation of a massive industrial action in the textile industry. This industrial action 
continued for 18 months, and spilled over into other industries. It came to an end after the 
central government took over the management of 13 textile units in October 1983. The 
long strike in India’s (then) largest industry created a severe disruption in investment and 
the 1982-83 net entry rate was a staggering negative 11 per cent (Table 1), the lowest for 
any year since 1975-76. During the eighties, 1986-87 was the only other year where the 
net entry rate was negative (minus 3 per cent). The second important political 
phenomenon occurred in the second half of the nineties. In 1996, the reforming 
government that came to power in 1991 was succeeded, within a span of three years, by 
three coalition governments, the first two of which were supported by the Left parties and 
were of the general view that the reform process was hurting the poor. The consequent 
slowdown of the reforms process, together with the macroeconomic impact of the South 
East Asian currency crisis and the post-Pokhran sanctions imposed by a number of 
                                                 
5  Use of plant-level data to analyze the dynamics of (cross-border) entry can be found in Roberts 
and Tybout (1997).  12
countries, led to a significant slowdown of the manufacturing sector during the second 
half of the nineties. 
 
Table 1 
Variation in Net Entry Rates Over Time 
 
Seventies Eighties  Nineties 
Year 
Number 
of 
Plants 
Net 
Entry 
Rate Year 
Number 
of 
Plants 
Net 
Entry 
Rate Year 
Number 
of 
Plants 
Net 
Entry 
Rate 
   1980-81  93555 1.67 1991-92  108709  1.84
      1981-82 101639 8.64 1992-93 115641  6.38
   1982-83  90159 -11.29 1993-94  118141  2.16
   1983-84  93369 3.56 1994-95  119188  0.89
   1984-85  93547 0.19 1995-96  130215  9.25
   1985-86  97531 4.26 1996-97  129631  -0.45
1975-76 69174    1986-87 94628 -2.98 1997-98  130139  0.39
1976-77 78744 13.83  1987-88 99345 4.98 1998-99  122810  -5.63
1977-78  82228  4.42  1988-89 100701 1.36 1999-00 121900  -0.74
1978-79  85454  3.92  1989-90 104526 3.80 2000-01 121453  -0.37
1979-80  92022  7.69  1990-91 106750 2.13 2001-02 118691  -2.27
Note: The number of plants refers to the total for the 15 most industrialized states. 
 
In the first 5 years of the eighties, the average net entry rate was 0.55, and in the next 5 
years it was 2.29, giving us an average rate of 1.42 for the decade. In the nineties, the first 
half witnessed a higher net entry rate (2.68) than in the second half (0.56), and the 
average net entry rate for all the 10 years was 1.62. From the summary statistics, 
therefore, there is not much that distinguishes the two decades. The statistics merely 
reflect the fact that the business/policy environment was more conducive for entry in the 
second half of the eighties than in the first half, and during the first half of the nineties 
than during the second half. 
 
However, this aggregate data does not reveal the role of state governments and 
institutions (i.e., economic federalism) in influencing the variation of net entry rates 
across the states. To recapitulate, prior to the nineties, the focus of the centrally 
controlled industrial policy was on reducing regional disparities. The liberalization 
policies of the nineties resulted in greater economic federalism and states had the 
opportunity to influence both the geographical location and the subsequent performance  13
of industrial units by way of differences in the nature of implementation of regulations 
and the quality of governance, in general, across states. Earlier, location of industrial 
units was not based on optimal decisions on the part of the firms. But, in the nineties, 
industrial units were increasingly located in states that were industry friendly and had a 
better investment climate (Table 2).
6 It is immediately evident that in most states the net 
entry rate in the nineties has been considerably higher than in the eighties, and that a drop 
in average entry rates are concentrated among four states: Uttar Pradesh (UPR), Madhya 
Pradesh (APR), Andhra Pradesh (APR) and Bihar (BIH). With the exception of Andhra 
Pradesh, all these states are known for their poor governance levels, and low levels of 
economic prosperity. 
 
Table 2 
Variation of Net Entry Rates Across States 
 
States 1980-89  1990-99 
Rajasthan 2.30 5.18
Tamil Nadu  3.54 4.01
Kerala 1.17 3.67
Haryana 3.39 3.28
Gujarat 0.40 3.25
Maharashtra 0.56 2.31
Karnataka 0.72 2.09
West Bengal  -1.13 1.99
Delhi 0.12 1.64
Orissa 1.02 1.39
Punjab 1.81 1.35
Uttar Pradesh  3.80 0.49
Madhya Pradesh  0.12 -0.09
Andhra Pradesh  3.80 -1.20
Bihar -1.89 -5.83
All India  1.42 1.62
 
This increase in the relative importance of state-level factors in determining the location 
of industrial units during the nineties is highlighted in Figure 1. Here we plot the 
coefficient of variation (standard deviation divided by the absolute value of the mean 
entry rate) in the state-level net entry rates between 1975-76 and 2000-01. Until 1993, 
                                                 
6  The states considered here are listed in the Appendix 1 and account for more than 95 per cent of 
all industrial units and the total population.  14
with the singular exception of 1984-85, this variation is negligible, but becomes more 
pronounced after 1993. The spike in 1984-85 can be explained by a major political event 
that had a differential impact in the northern and southern Indian states, namely, the 
assassination of the then Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in October 1984. The 
assassination of the Prime Minister was followed by a series of riots in northern India that 
had disrupted all forms of economic activities, while the southern states remained 
relatively calm. 
 
Figure 2 
Convergence of Net Entry Rates Across States 
 
FIGURE 1: Convergence across States: Rate of Entry
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Finally, the difference in the net entry patterns between the eighties and the nineties are 
evident from the state-level changes in industrial density, measured as number of 
industrial units per million people, over these two decades (Table 3).
7 During the eighties, 
industrial density declined or remained the same in most of the states, Tamil Nadu (TND) 
and Andhra Pradesh (APR) being the two exceptions. The decline was most noticeable in 
                                                 
7  Note that the industrial density declined, by and large, during the eighties, and increased to 
recover lost ground during the nineties. Once again, this is consistent with the hypothesis that 
reforms in eighties were pro-incumbent while those in nineties were pro-entrant.  15
states like Gujarat (GUJ) and Maharashtra (MAH) that enjoyed much higher per capita 
GDP relative to the national average, and in states like West Bengal (WBL) where 
politics was dominated by Left parties that were hostile to both the private sector and the 
Congress government at the centre. In other words, there is prima facie evidence about 
the use of licensing policies to redistribute resources across states. During the nineties, on 
the other hand, there was a noticeable rise in the industrial density of states like 
Maharashtra, Rajasthan (RAJ) and Kerala, and further consolidation of “high industrial 
density” status of states like Tamil Nadu, relative to other states. These are states that are 
known either for relatively high levels of infrastructure, or business-friendly 
governments, or high skilled labour within the Indian context, thereby providing some 
support for the hypothesis that local business environment was a key determinant of 
state-level net entry rates during the nineties.
8 
 
Table 3 
Number of Factories for Every Million People 
 
State 1980-81 1989-90 1997-98
Delhi 0.53 0.36 0.29
Punjab 0.34 0.31 0.29
Gujarat 0.33 0.27 0.29
Maharashtra 0.25 0.20 0.23
Tamil Nadu  0.21 0.25 0.33
Andhra Pradesh  0.21 0.25 0.26
Haryana 0.19 0.20 0.21
Karnataka 0.15 0.13 0.14
Kerala 0.12 0.12 0.16
West Bengal  0.12 0.08 0.09
Rajasthan 0.08 0.07 0.10
Madhya Pradesh  0.07 0.05 0.08
Uttar Pradesh  0.07 0.07 0.07
Bihar 0.06 0.04 0.03
Orissa 0.06 0.05 0.05
All India  0.15 0.13 0.15
 
The above analysis substantiates, in part, the two hypotheses that we have examined thus 
far: the Rodrik and Subramaniun hypothesis that reforms in the eighties were pro-
                                                 
8  The industrial density in Delhi declined during both the eighties and the nineties. However, 
Delhi is a special case: a number of court cases led to the relocation of factories outside the state 
for environmental concerns.  16
incumbent while those in the nineties were pro-entrant (or pro-competition), and our own 
hypothesis that greater economic federalism in the nineties implied that location/entry of 
industrial units would be influenced by local or state-level conditions more in nineties 
than in the eighties. In the following two sections, we closely examine the experiences of 
two major manufacturing industries in India, namely, textiles and electrical machinery, to 
seek further corroboration for these hypotheses. 
 
4. Textiles 
4.1 Background 
Since the early nineties, the government has been reforming the economy in two major 
ways: (1) institutional harmonization with the rest of the world in terms of policy, legal 
codes, tax systems and other regulatory arrangements, and (2) systematic moves towards 
market-based trade and financial flows (D’Souza, 2005). This has been especially true for 
the textile industry, which is India’s largest employer (at 30 million workers it is the 
second largest employer after agriculture), largest contributor to exports (35 per cent of 
export earnings), and a significant part of India’s GDP (more than 4 per cent) and total 
excise revenue (8 per cent). India’s 3 per cent (USD 10 billion) share in world textile 
exports is, however, very small, especially in relation to China’s export share of 14 per 
cent. The popular wisdom about this sector is that in the aftermath of the enforcement of 
the Multi Fibre Agreement, India will capture more than 15 per cent of the global export 
market, still much less than the projected 50 per cent market share of China but 
significant in itself. However, the WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) will 
ensure that while India will no longer face quotas in importing countries, its producers 
will also face tougher import competition in the domestic market. In this section, we 
outline the structure of the textiles sector in India, and then proceed to compare the net 
entry patterns in the industry during the eighties and nineties. 
 
India is the third largest producer of cotton with a world share of 14 per cent. The cotton 
and ginning sector is highly fragmented, and is marked by a poor technological level. Its 
historical cost advantage in the global market is being slowly eroded by low quality seeds 
and poor productivity. Despite of the reforms started in 1985, cotton continued to be a  17
highly controlled item until the end of the nineties. Such controls were exercised in its 
pricing, exports and use (in the handloom sector). Prior to the Textile Policy of 1985, the 
licensing requirements prevented this sector from exploiting the scale and scope 
economies that define the technology in this sector in the rest of the world. Even now, the 
Man-Made Fibre (MMF) and Synthetic Fibre Filament industry is a capital-intensive 
sector dominated by 11 firms. The total production of fabrics is about 41 billion square 
meters, with around 60 per cent attributable to powerlooms, 19 per cent to handlooms, 17 
per cent to hosieries (yarn), and the rest to large mills. 
 
The weaving sector, an important component of the process of fabric production, is 
highly fragmented with handloom units producing around 5 metres per day along, and 
looms in mills producing 250-300 metres per eight-hour shift. The non-mill sector in 
India is often termed the “decentralized” sector and, in addition to handlooms, includes 
powerlooms and hosiery. This decentralized sector is by far the more important part of 
this industry segment, accounting for more than 90 per cent of all cloth production. As is 
evident from Table 4, there has been a general decline in the importance of the mill sector 
in the nineties, and much of the ground lost by the mills has been captured by hosiery.  
 
Table 4 
Sector Wise Production of Cloth (percentages of million square metres) 
 
Year  Mill  Handloom  Powerloom  Hosiery  Khadi, wool and silk  Total 
1990-91 11.1  18.41  57.21 11.56 1.72  23330
1991-92 10.34  17.94  57.72 12.3 1.7  22978
1992-93 7.85  20.49  57.48 12.49 1.69  25475
1993-94 7.13  20.97  57.33 13.04 1.53  27898
1994-95 7.94  21.6  55.85 13.1 1.51  28606
1995-96 6.32  22.54  53.82 15.76 1.56  31958
1996-97 5.62  21.4  55.55 15.88 1.55  34838
1997-98 5.2 20.31  55.96 17.08 1.46  37441
1998-99 4.94  18.8  57.27 17.37 1.62  36127
1999-00 4.37  18.75  59.14 16.26 1.48  39208
2000-01 4.15  18.65  59.13 16.63 1.44  40256
Source: Compendium of Textile Statistics, Government of India. 
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The decline in the mill sector is an example of how industry has been affected by the 
policies of the pre-reform era. For instance, till 1985, additional looms were not allowed 
in the mill sector and the number of automatic looms was restricted to ensure greater 
employment. Further, decentralized powerlooms enjoyed fiscal concessions unavailable 
to the mill sector. As a consequence, India has the highest number of looms in the world 
but has the lowest share of shuttle-less looms. The export share of the decentralized 
sector is 66 per cent of all fabric exports in value terms (D’Souza, 2005). Mill sector 
export is concentrated mostly on grey and dried fabrics, which are high-value items.  
 
The organizational set-up of the textile industry is also worth noting. Prior to the reforms 
of the nineties, the mills were simply the producers of fabric, and the marketing of the 
product was done through a series of intermediaries. As exports grew in volume, mostly 
in small tranches, these intermediaries increasingly started dealing with small powerloom 
production units that possessed greater flexibility since they were outside the scope of the 
restrictive government (industrial) regulations and labour laws. In the current policy 
regime, the Textile Upgradation Fund Scheme offers special incentives (interest subsidy 
on technology-related loans and more generous depreciation allowances) to enable 
modernization in the sector, and the fiscal system also has been reformed to 
reduce/eliminate the differential treatment of the mill and non-mill sectors. Consequently, 
the mills have become technologically improved, and, while the aggregate data do not 
reveal any change in fortune of the mills as yet, anecdotal evidence suggests that an 
increasing number of integrated mills are making significant comebacks in the textile 
sector.  
 
The processing sector has faced policy hurdles in much the same way as the weaving 
sector. For example, excise polices supported the growth of hand-processors as opposed 
to more productive power-processors. Further, duties on imported equipment (and 
components) were kept high, once again having a negative impact on the productivity of 
this sector. Indeed, this sector continues to be the weakest link in the textile industry. 
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Finally, in the garment segment, exporting firms usually sub-contract production out to 
fabricators (sewing outfits) instead of producing the garments themselves (Khanna, 
1991).
9 India sub-contracts 74 per cent of its garment exports, compared to 11 per cent in 
Hong Kong, 18 per cent in China, 20 per cent in Thailand and 36 per cent in Taiwan. The 
flexibility that subcontracting offers the exporters also results in an exclusion from the 
mass market for apparel exports that requires consistent quality across large volumes. 
The inability of the garment “manufacturers” to exploit economies of scale is also 
reflected in the low productivity of the Indian garment sector relative to those in the 
neighboring countries. While a typical Indian worker makes 6-7 shirts a day, workers in 
neighboring Sri Lanka and Nepal make 22-32 shirts a day (D’Souza, 2005). According to 
the Confederation of Indian Industry’s Textile Committee, labor laws are currently the 
only major obstacle to establishment of large scale factory production facilities; all the 
other hurdles like reservations for the small scale industry, cap on foreign direct 
investment, etc., have been eliminated. 
 
4.2 Entry in the Eighties and Nineties 
The experience of the textile industry in India is a good example of how industries 
respond to policy regimes. The Textile Policy of 1985 specifically addressed the issue of 
efficiency as, by then, it had become eminently clear that policies that restricted plant 
size, the use of technology and the purchase of capital equipment were increasingly 
stifling this very important manufacturing sector. Table 5 reports the net growth rate of 
the number of textile units in the two decades.
10 
 
 
 
                                                 
9  At the turn of the millennium, about half of the garment market in India was for local and 
traditional tailor-made dresses. The size of the non-traditional market was USD 9 billion, 60 per 
cent of which was for exports. The remaining 30 per cent was sold mostly in urban India and this 
segment of the domestic textile market has been growing at more than 5 per cent per year in the 
nineties. the size of the ready-made apparel market continues to be small, and close to 70 per cent 
of this market is comprised of branded products.  
 
10  Recall that we had said in the beginning that the changed classification after 1997-98 in the 3-
digit industries restricts us to 1997-98 as the end year for our analysis.  20
Table 5 
Net Entry Rate in the Textiles Sector 
 
Year  All States  Net Entry Rate  Year  All States  Net Entry Rate 
1980-81 5073  1991-92 5779 0.17 
1981-82 5283  4.14 1992-93 6546 13.27 
1982-83 4398  -16.75 1993-94 7937 21.25 
1983-84 4561  3.71 1994-95 8349 5.19 
1984-85 4971  8.99 1995-96 9216 10.38 
1985-86 4858  -2.27 1996-97 9250 0.37 
1986-87 4742  -2.39 1997-98 8673 -6.24 
1987-88 4984  5.10      
1988-89 5179  3.91      
1989-90 5515  6.49      
1990-91 5769  4.61      
 
 
The first thing noticeable in Table 5 is the huge drop in the number of factories in 1982-
83, a consequence of the major industrial action in this sector mentioned earlier in the 
paper. Overall, the net entry rate for the textiles industry was 1.2 per cent during the 
eighties, and more than 6 per cent during the nineties. If 1982-83 is treated as an outlier, 
and left out of the sample, then the average rate of net entry in the eighties increases 
sharply to 3.5 per cent, but this is still well below the average net entry rate observed in 
the nineties. Once again, this is consistent with the hypothesis that the reforms of the 
nineties were relatively more pro-entrant (or pro-competition).  
 
The Textiles Policy of 1985 had the following major thrust areas (Jain, 1988): incentive 
for modernization, flexibility of fibre-use (i.e., economies of scope), removal of 
unnecessary controls and regulations on existing units and, and closure of unviable mills. 
Further, the government announced that while licenses were still required to start a new 
plant or expand capacity in most cases, more licenses would be sanctioned. Interestingly, 
the government felt that capacities of existing synthetic fibres plants should be permitted 
to increase to certain “efficient” levels without recourse to the usual government 
licensing procedures, and these government-determined efficient levels were to be the 
minimum capacity at which new entrants were allowed entry. As in the case of broad-
banding, this permission to expand capacity to prescribed minimum efficient levels was 
potentially more beneficial to existing units; the requirement of a minimum capacity for  21
new entrants could impose capital-related entry barriers. Indeed, while the state-owned 
development financial institutions were instructed to disburse soft loans to existing 
industrial units to facilitate increase in their capacity to “optimal” levels, no such 
directives existed for new entrants. 
 
The pro-incumbent leaning of the so-called “efficient industry” policy is also evident in 
the withdrawal of de-licensing in the spinning sector. In 1975, cotton spinning up to a 
capacity of 50,000 spindles had been de-licensed and firms could freely enter this size 
segment of the sector. In 1985, the government decided that this sector had grown more 
than was “desirable” and, therefore, licences were reintroduced such that new plants 
could come up only in government designated geographical and economic areas. 
 
The post-1991 reforms opened up the textile sector to potential entrants in much the same 
way as it did for all other sectors. For the textile sector, this meant more than simply the 
abolition of licensing. In this sector, a number of activities were reserved for the small 
scale segment of the industry, and mills were not allowed to increase their capacity. 
These size-related restrictions were mostly eliminated in the nineties. For example, the 
mills were allowed to make new investments aimed at capacity expansion, and new mills 
were allowed to be set up. Also, the same fiscal incentives and disincentives were made 
applicable to all size segments of the textile sector, thereby evening the playing field for 
the large mills for the first time in decades. In addition, restrictions on foreign 
investment, foreign technology and foreign equipment were removed. It is easy to see 
why net entry in the nineties in the textile sector was much higher that that in the eighties.  
 
Table 6 reports the ownership of textile factories in 1989-90 and 2000-01. In 1989-90, all 
industrial units whose historical value of plant and machinery was below INR 10 million 
were officially defined to be small. By 2000-01, the definition of small had been changed 
such that small units were those whose historical plant and machinery value was less than 
INR 30 million. Given that labor laws, among others, still favor small production units, it 
is not surprising that even in 2000-01 about 90 per cent of the industrial units in the 
textiles sector were small. However, it is also instructive that between 1989-90 and 2000- 22
01 the proportion of large units had nearly doubled, despite the reclassification of “small” 
units that should have deemed a greater proportion of the production units to be small. As 
discussed earlier, this was a consequence of the dismantling of small and inefficient 
powerlooms and integration of production processes to increase the scale of production. 
This is also consistent with the sharp reduction in the number of both small and large 
production units owned by “rest,” this residual ownership category comprising primarily 
of loss-making units that were taken over by the central government to avoid closure.  
 
Table 6 
Distribution of Textile Factories by Ownership and Size Class 
 
Small 
  1989-90 2000-01 
Ownership  Units Percentage Units Percentage 
Local/State government  169 1.35 117 1.09
Fully private  11863 94.77 10417 97.14
Rest 486 3.88 189 1.77
All 12518 100.00 10723 100.00
 
Large 
  1989-90 2000-01 
Ownership  Units Percentage Units Percentage 
Local/State government  66 4.97 51 2.17
Fully private  1018 76.66 2143 90.97
Rest 244 18.37 162 6.86
All 1328 100.00 2356 100.00
 
The fact that the nineties encouraged competition through entry becomes is even more 
evident from the data reported in Table 7. The data indicate that between 1989-90 and 
2000-01 there was a increase in the entry of both small and large production units, but 
that the increase was much more significant for large units than for small units. It is 
equally instructive that during the nineties there was a sharp decrease in the number of 
small units that were in existence since the fifties. This decline in the number of small 
units can be on account of either vertical or horizontal integration across production units 
to reap economies of scale, or exit of small and unviable production units in a 
competitive environment.  
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Table 7 
Distribution of Textile Factories by Age and Size Class 
 
Small 
  1989-90 2000-01 
Age  in  Years  Units Percentage Units Percentage 
0-10 5556  44.47 4903 46.02
10-20 3817  30.55 3163 29.68
20-30 1533  12.27 1425 13.38
30-40 785  6.28 722 6.78
40+ 804  6.43 441 4.14
 
Large 
  1989-90 2000-01 
Age  in  Years  Units Percentage Units Percentage 
0-10 468  35.30 1041 44.31
10-20 242  18.22 667 28.38
20-30 196  14.79 224 9.54
30-40 121  9.13 128 5.46
40+ 299  22.56 290 12.32
 
 
In Tables 8 and 9 we report the average book value of loans outstanding of textile plants, 
by size and ownership, and by size and age, respectively. In 1989-90, an average private 
factory had a loan exposure that was only 80.52 per cent of that of the average textile 
unit, and the small private sector units’ loan proportion actually fell between 1989-90 and 
2000-01. Indeed, in both years, the non-private sector had larger outstanding book values 
of loans compared to the private sector. However, the large private sector units were 
relatively better off than the small private sector units. The average loan exposure of 
large private units increased significantly between 1989-90 and 2000-01, such that by the 
latter year the book value of loans of the average large private unit was a respectable 
89.47 per cent of the book value of loans of the average unit.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  24
Table 8 
Loans per Textile Factory by Ownership and Size Class (INR million) 
 
Small 
  1989-90 2000-01 
Ownership  Loan Percentage  SE  Loan Percentage  SE 
Local/State government  10.20 1025.31 6.89 40.37 573.66  16.90
Fully private  0.80 80.52 0.03 5.39 76.61  0.40
Rest 2.48 249.30 0.85 96.86 1376.31  24.80
All 1.00 100.00 0.10 7.04 100.00  0.53
 
Large 
  1989-90 2000-01 
Ownership  Loan Percentage  SE  Loan Percentage  SE 
Local/State government  79.26 160.55 12.90 201.40 130.02  49.80
Fully private  36.10 73.12 4.84 138.60 89.48  14.90
Rest 95.99 194.44 15.90 313.20 202.19  74.50
All 49.37 100.00 4.83 154.90 100.00  14.90
 
From Table 9, it is evident that between the two points in time there had been a 
significant increase in the book value of outstanding loans of both small and large new 
units. The increase was 524 per cent for small units and 456 per cent for large units. It is 
evident that the reforms of the nineties had included policy initiatives that facilitated the 
access of new production units in the textile industry to credit.
11 Once again, this 
evidence is consistent with the prior/hypothesis that the reforms of the nineties were pro-
entrant. 
 
Table 9 
Loans per Textile Factory by Age and Size Class (INR million) 
 
Small 
  1989-90 2000-01 
Age in Years  Loan  Percentage  SE  Loan  Percentage  SE 
0-10 0.90  90.36 0.04 5.62 79.91  0.45
10-20 0.82  82.30 0.07 5.30 75.38  0.59
20-30 0.67  67.37 0.07 6.07 86.32  1.05
30-40 0.91  91.81 0.17 5.30 75.32  1.11
40+ 3.20  321.22 1.56 40.29 572.50  11.20
All 1.00  100.00 0.10 7.04 100.00  0.53
                                                 
11  Banerjee and Duflo (2002) provide some evidence that even in the nineties public sector banks 
in India, that together occupy about 80 per cent of the credit space, may have actually followed 
credit disbursal policy that were pro-incumbent, but their evidence is limited in nature, and very 
difficult to generalize.  25
  Large 
  1989-90 2000-01 
Age in Years  Loan  Percentage  SE  Loan  Percentage  SE 
0-10 28.46  57.65 2.95 158.40 102.26  24.80
10-20 39.36  79.73 15.40 83.32 53.79  15.90
20-30 49.32  99.91 17.40 114.80 74.11  20.10
30-40 31.58  63.96 6.45 188.40 121.63  83.70
40+ 102.10  206.81 12.20 307.00 198.19  54.90
All 49.37  100.00 4.83 154.90 100.00  14.90
 
 
4.3 Regional Variations 
At first sight, the distributions of textile factories across the states during the eighties and 
the nineties runs counter to our hypothesis that during the nineties economic federalism 
and the consequent competition among states to attract industrial units led to changes in 
the pattern of location of these units relative to that in the eighties. As evident from Table 
10, the four states that accounted for more than 75 per cent of textile factories in the 
beginning of the eighties, continued to account for about 70 per cent of these factories 
towards the end of the nineties. However, of these four states, Tamil Nadu (TND) gained 
significantly, at the expense of Maharashtra (MAH), Gujarat (GUJ) and Punjab (PUN). 
Indeed, the density of textile units in Tamil Nadu, which remained roughly unchanged 
during the eighties, more than doubled between 1989-90 and 1997-98. This is consistent 
with Tamil Nadu’s success in attracting new firms/plants in industries like machine tools, 
auto ancillaries, software and financial services. This is in sharp contrast with the steep 
decline in the share of (and density in) states like West Bengal (WBL) and Bihar (BIH) 
that are known for labor militancy and misgovernance, respectively.  
 
Table 10 
Distribution and Density of Textile Factories across States 
 
Distribution (Percentage)  Density (Per Million People) 
States  1980-81 1989-90 1997-98 1980-81 1989-90  1997-98
Tamil Nadu  20.64  27.33 36.64 0.0217 0.0275  0.0528
Maharashtra 27.08  23.43 17.03 0.0588 0.0423  0.0449
Gujarat 13.33  10.84 8.69 0.0469 0.0330  0.0300
Punjab 15.38  11.80 7.94 0.0221 0.0169  0.0163
Karnataka 4.38  3.72 6.71 0.0200 0.0148  0.0162
Delhi 7.06  6.82 6.30 0.0060 0.0047  0.0115
Rajasthan 1.95  3.99 5.41 0.0065 0.0048  0.0092 26
Uttar Pradesh  1.85  3.64 3.94 0.0029 0.0052  0.0091
Andhra Pradesh  1.28  2.30 2.13 0.0012 0.0020  0.0025
Haryana 1.64  1.38 2.03 0.0009 0.0015  0.0022
Madhya Pradesh  1.56  1.98 1.20 0.0012 0.0015  0.0021
West Bengal  2.54  1.52 0.92 0.0015 0.0017  0.0019
Kerala 0.59  0.76 0.76 0.0024 0.0013  0.0010
Orissa 0.26  0.36 0.23 0.0005 0.0006  0.0006
Bihar 0.47  0.13 0.06 0.0003 0.0001  0.0001
All India  100  100 100 0.0079 0.0071  0.0099
 
In Table 11 we report the average number of workers per unit in the different states. This 
data not only reflects the size of the average factory in a state, but also, to an extent, the 
technology employed, the organization of the units, and perhaps the local business 
environment. In particular, it also gives us an idea about the extent to which textile 
factories in different states were able to respond to the increased competition that called 
for lower labor cost and use of cutting edge technology to increase productivity. It is 
interesting to note that the four states that accounted for 70-75 per cent of the textile 
factories during the eighties and the nineties were much smaller than their counterparts in 
other states, when size is measured in terms of employment. Given the nature of labor 
laws in India, the most plausible implication of this observation is that these four states 
were more liberal about allowing textile firms to set up capital and technology intensive 
plants, thereby emphasizing production and cost efficiency over employment and social 
justice. This interpretation of the data is consistent with the observation that the 
employment per factory was the highest (and percentage decline in employment over 
time the lowest) in states like West Bengal (WBL), Orissa (ORI) and Kerala (KER) 
where successive governments have pursued policies that were labor-friendly and 
emphasized social justice over industrial efficiency.  
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Table 11 
Workers per Textile Factory 
 
State 1980-81 1989-90 1997-98
Orissa 522 607 494
Bihar 140 360 366
Madhya Pradesh 629 354 351
West Bengal  446 417 311
Kerala 407 272 198
Karnataka 158 198 172
Andhra Pradesh  302 199 167
Uttar Pradesh  666 315 154
Haryana 188 146 119
Rajasthan 257 134 118
Gujarat 289 212 102
Maharashtra 147 122 91
Tamil Nadu  128 111 90
Punjab 23 61 58
Delhi 69 49 32
All India  170 141 104
 
 
5. Electrical Machinery 
5.1 Background 
The electrical machinery sector is a part of the overall machinery, or capital goods sector. 
Successive industrial policies since the fifties, which emphasized the rise of heavy 
industries and import substitution as policy objectives, envisaged the growth of a strong 
electrical machinery sector, along with many others. Hence, the experience of the 
electrical machinery sector long reflected the experience of the broader manufacturing 
sector in India. In 1982, for example, the massive industrial action affected it in much the 
same way as the rest of the manufacturing sector. Similarly, in 1985, like most other 
sectors, electrical machinery too was covered by the broad banding scheme. This sector 
also benefited from the eighties’ policy focus on the capital and technology of incumbent 
industrial units. A notable initiative in this respect was the launching of the Technology 
Up gradation Fund for five groups of capital goods industries in August of 1987.  
 
The nineties were marked primarily for the dismantling of the high tariff walls that were 
used to protect this industry from import competition since the fifties. The period from  28
1991-92 to 1995-96 witnessed a sharp 70 per cent decline in the tariffs on capital goods.
12 
After incurring a steep adjustment cost in the initial years, this sector in fact responded 
very positively and successfully retooled, restructured and reengineered and clocked very 
healthy growth rates in the years 1995-96 and 1996-97. After dismal growth during the 
first three years of reforms, the capital goods sector staged a smart recovery and recorded 
a 24.8 percent growth in 1995-96, and followed it up with 17.9 percent growth during the 
following year. Indeed, as noted by the Confederation of the Indian Industry, the highest 
rates of growth of this sector coincided with the deepest cuts in import tariff, suggesting 
that the forces of competition and the access to foreign technology benefited the sector 
significantly.  
 
A major tariff irritant for this sector has been the high rates of import tariff on raw 
materials, e.g., duties on imported steel. While custom duty on capital goods was brought 
to the WTO-bound rate of 25 per cent, there was no corresponding reduction on the 
duties on raw materials required for manufacturing of capital goods. During much of the 
nineties, this created an anomalous situation where the custom duty on inputs was higher 
than that on the final product. For the capital goods sector, in general, this anomaly was 
finally rectified in 1999-00, and the capital goods manufacturers were allowed to import 
steel at 25 per cent duty. However, electrical machinery manufacturers continue to pay 35 
per cent duty on copper imports, the cost of copper accounting for approximately 35-40 
per cent of the cost of electrical machinery. 
 
In other words, the electrical machinery sector experienced something akin to shock 
therapy during the nineties, and this makes the experience of this sector important in the 
context of capacity expansion by existing units and entry of new production units. In the 
following section, we take a closer look at the net entry rate and related issues for this 
sector during the eighties and the nineties. 
 
 
                                                 
12  Between 1996-97 and 2001-02, the tariffs on capital goods remained roughly the same. It 
dropped to 20 per cent in 1997-98, but was back at the earlier level of 25 per cent in 1999-2000. 
The tariff rate continues to be the same.  29
5.2 Entry Rates in Electrical Machinery 
We do the same analysis of the electrical machinery sector as we did for the textile 
sector. It is evident from Table 12 that in the early eighties this industry experienced the 
same industrial action induced negative entry rate as the textile industry. . The net entry 
rates during the rest of the years reflect the experience of the capital goods industry in 
India: growth and hence significant (positive) net entry in much of the eighties and the 
nineties, and a slow down in growth and consequently negative net entry during the late 
nineties.  The average entry rate in the eighties, in spite of the events of 1982-83, was 4.3 
per cent, compared to a 2.4 per cent in the nineties. This is clearly different from in the 
experience of the textiles industry, for which these rates were roughly the same for the 
two decades. This raises the question as to whether the decline in the net entry rate in the 
nineties reflects greater import competition or a preference for larger (and, consequently, 
fewer) production units. 
 
Table 12 
Net Entry Rate in the Electrical Machinery Sector 
 
Year  All States  Net Entry Rate  Year  All States  Net Entry Rate 
1980-81 3406  1991-92 4968 -0.54 
1981-82 4229  24.16 1992-93 5262 5.92 
1982-83 3641  -13.90 1993-94 5260 -0.04 
1983-84 3661  0.55 1994-95 5501 4.58 
1984-85 3831  4.64 1995-96 5659 2.87 
1985-86 4066  6.13 1996-97 6088 7.58 
1986-87 3888  -4.38 1997-98 5740 -5.72 
1987-88 4241  9.08      
1988-89 4496  6.01      
1989-90 4790  6.54      
1990-91 4995  4.28      
 
Table 13 reports the size and ownership distributions of production units for the electrical 
machinery industry, and these distributions changed over the two decades. The first thing 
to note is the sharp decline in the total number of small and large units, though the 
decline in small is much more than that among the large units. This is also consistent with 
the decline in the share of the young (i.e., 0-10 years) units in the age distribution of both 
small and large firms between 1989-90 and 2000-01 (Table 14). This suggests that the  30
post- 1996-97 decline in the number of industrial units in the electrical machinery sector 
was reinforced (even further accelerated) in the following years, and confirms our earlier 
point that the capital goods sector, as a whole, faced a serious challenge in the last few 
years of the last millennium. However, the silver lining is that in terms of percentage 
change the sharpest decline was experienced in the number of state-owned units (72 per 
cent for small and 88 per cent for large); the decline in the number of privately owned 
units was not as significant for the small scale units (24 per cent), and marginal for the 
large scale units. A possible interpretation of these trends is that the incentives to entry 
were already high in the eighties, when policy initiatives encouraged production of 
capital goods, such that most of the entry had taken place in the eighties itself. In the 
nineties, on the other hand, the pro-competition stance of the policies encouraged the 
closure of unprofitable units, and, to that extent, it can hardly be surprising that the 
closures were most evident among the state-owned units. 
 
Table 13 
Distribution of Electrical Machinery Factories by Ownership and Size Class 
 
Small 
  1989-90 2000-01 
Ownership Units  Percentage Units  Percentage
Local/State government  43 1.01 12 0.38 
Fully private  4121 96.54 3117 98.94 
Rest 104 2.45 21 0.68 
All 4269 100.00 3150 100.00 
 
Large 
  1989-90 2000-01 
Ownership Units  Percentage Units  Percentage
Local/State government  25 5.13 3 0.75 
Fully private  377.3 77.43 374 93.18 
Rest 85 17.44 24 6.07 
All 487 100.00 402 100.00 
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Table 14 
Distribution of Electrical Machinery Factories by Age and Size Class 
 
Small 
  1989-90 2000-01 
Age in Years  Units  Percentage Units  Percentage
0-10 1967  46.14 975 30.96
10-20 1421  33.33 1230 39.06
20-30 592  13.90 606 19.25
30-40 176  4.12 216 6.85
40+ 106  2.50 122 3.89
 
Large 
  1989-90 2000-01 
Age in Years  Units  Percentage Units  Percentage
0-10 233  48.09 111 28.26
10-20 97  20.11 118 29.95
20-30 82  16.93 80 20.32
30-40 34  7.02 34 8.65
40+ 38  7.85 50 12.82
 
The vision of creative destruction created by Tables 13 and 14, however, has to be 
tempered in light of the information we have on the availability of loans. The size-
ownership and size-age distributions of loans are reported in Tables 15 and 16. It is 
evident that state-owned units are likely to have much greater access to loans than their 
private sector counterparts. While an average private sector unit receives between 83 and 
97 per cent of the loan available to the average production unit, the corresponding figure 
for a state-owned unit is between 162 per cent and 667 per cent, the smaller units being 
the main beneficiaries. Given the overwhelming dominance of the state-owned banks in 
the credit market, this leads to the question as to whether, despite extensive banking 
sector reforms in the nineties, moral suasion was used to sustain production in state-
owned units in the electrical machinery sector as long as possible. 
 
The data also highlight that availability of credit might be a binding constraint facing 
relatively young large units. While very new small units (i.e., 0-10 years) have access to 
loans at par with the average small production unit, a very new large unit receives only 
66 per cent of the loans available to the average large unit. This is consistent with recent 
research that indicates that, despite the greater ability of the Indian banks to decide their  32
portfolio choice in the nineties and beyond, an average domestic bank remains risk averse 
(Bhaumik and Piesse, 2005), thereby limiting its willingness to make large loans to 
relatively new production units.
13 
 
Table 15 
Loans per Electrical Machinery Factory by Ownership and Size Class (INR million) 
 
Small 
  1989-90 2000-01 
Ownership Loan  Percentage SE  Loan  Percentage  SE 
Local/State government  10.03 642.03 2.48 35.01 667.19  8.12
Fully private  1.44 92.28 0.08 5.09 97.02  0.55
Rest 2.86 182.99 0.73 13.03 248.30  7.53
All 1.56 100.00 0.08 5.25 100.00  0.55
 
Large 
  1989-90 2000-01 
Ownership Loan  Percentage SE  Loan  Percentage  SE 
Local/State government  63.63 81.40 22.50 291.10 162.44  151.00
Fully private  55.13 70.53 17.50 149.30 83.31  25.40
Rest 174.40 223.11 59.30 670.00 373.88  215.00
All 78.17 100.00 17.50 179.20 100.00  28.90
 
 
Table 16 
Loans per Electrical Machinery Factory by Age and Size Class (INR million) 
 
Small 
  1989-90 2000-01 
Age in Years  Loan  Percentage SE  Loan  Percentage SE 
0-10 1.85  118.22 0.14 6.28 119.76 1.24 
10-20 1.16  73.95 0.10 4.18 79.62 0.71 
20-30 1.23  78.77 0.18 4.48 85.42 1.08 
30-40 2.43  155.27 0.85 7.46 142.19 1.87 
40+ 1.60  102.29 0.44 9.12 173.79 3.95 
All 1.56  100.00 0.08 5.25 100.00 0.55 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 Note that the production units in the 10-30 year age category were clearly at a disadvantage 
over much older firms. This is consistent with recent research that has shown that bank loans are 
skewed in favor of firms that have long-term relationship with the banks, irrespective of their 
growth potential (Banerjee and Duflo, 2002).  33
Large 
  1989-90 2000-01 
Age in Years  Loan  Percentage SE  Loan  Percentage SE 
0-10 55.24  70.67 20.40 119.30 66.57 29.60 
10-20 47.54  60.82 15.60 180.90 100.95 49.50 
20-30 108.10  138.29 32.50 106.30 59.32 33.40 
30-40 65.90  84.31 27.50 290.60 162.17 95.80 
40+ 276.40  353.60 183.00 402.90 224.83 165.00 
All 78.17  100.00 17.50 179.20 100.00 28.90 
 
 
5.3 Regional Variations 
Tables 17 and 18 report the state-wise variations in the location and size of the electrical 
machinery production units. Note that Maharashtra (MAH), Gujarat (GUJ) and Tamil 
Nadu (TND), states that (aside from the greater-Delhi area) constitute the industrial hub 
of India, have accounted for over 50 per cent of the units since the early eighties. At the 
very least, this is consistent with the economic geography argument that new industries or 
firms prefer to be located in areas that are already industrialized, in order to benefit from 
the existence of appropriate infrastructure, concentration of (semi) skilled labor, and 
supply chains. The only aberration to this view is Uttar Pradesh (UPR), a state with 
chronic economic problems and low levels of governance, increasing its share by about 
66 per cent between 1980-81 and 1989-90, and eventually accounting for over 10 per 
cent of the production units in this sector. Part of this can be explained by the fact that 
some of the industrialization in the greater Delhi region has spilled over into Haryana and 
Uttar Pradesh. Further, as indicated in Table 17, the density of industrial units in Uttar 
Pradesh, one of the largest (and certainly the most populous) states in India, is less than 
half the national average (ALL), while the density in Maharashtra, Gujarat and Tamil 
Nadu are nearly double the national average or higher.  
 
 
 
 
 
  34
Table 17 
Distribution and Density of Textile Factories across States 
 
Distribution (Percentage)  Density (Per Million People) 
States  1980-81 1989-90 1997-98 1980-81 1989-90  1997-98
Maharashtra 24.88  23.19 26.69 0.0042 0.0047  0.0062
Tamil Nadu  14.51  12.38 12.87 0.0031 0.0035  0.0045
Gujarat 14.89  12.90 12.06 0.0046 0.0049  0.0054
Uttar Pradesh  6.44  10.03 10.01 0.0006 0.0011  0.0014
Karnataka 8.17  9.97 9.06 0.0023 0.0035  0.0038
West Bengal  9.41  5.28 5.62 0.0018 0.0012  0.0015
Andhra Pradesh  3.55  7.36 5.10 0.0007 0.0018  0.0015
Madhya Pradesh  2.21  3.26 4.67 0.0004 0.0008  0.0017
Delhi 5.19  5.73 4.58 0.0089 0.0099  0.0079
Kerala 1.83  1.69 2.29 0.0007 0.0009  0.0015
Rajasthan 1.83  1.56 2.05 0.0006 0.0006  0.0008
Punjab 4.03  3.00 1.91 0.0025 0.0023  0.0017
Haryana 1.63  1.95 1.67 0.0013 0.0019  0.0018
Orissa 0.29  0.72 1.00 0.0001 0.0004  0.0006
Bihar 1.15  0.98 0.43 0.0002 0.0002  0.0001
All India  100  100 100 0.0016 0.0020  0.0024
 
Table 18 indicates that the larger production units, as measured by employment, were 
located largely in states like Madhya Pradesh (MPR), Andhra Pradesh (APR) and Uttar 
Pradesh. Coincidentally, these are historically some of the poorest states in India, and 
hence a plausible explanation is that the larger than average employment in the units 
located in these states manifest an effort by governments to generate employment. The 
lower than average employment in the units located in states like Maharashtra, Gujarat 
and Tamil Nadu, on the other hand, raises the possibility of higher labor productivity in 
these states necessitating fewer employees per unit. However, the data reported in Table 
18 do not offer any clear pattern that can support either of these two explanations. It is 
obvious though that in all states there was a decline in the average size of an electrical 
machinery production unit, and this decline was much more significant during the 
nineties than during the eighties. This is further attestation of the view that this sector was 
facing mounting challenges during the nineties. 
 
 
 
  35
Table 18  
Workers per Electrical Machinery Factory 
 
State  1980-81 1989-90 1997-98 
Madhya Pradesh  389 200 118
Andhra Pradesh  142 64 85
Uttar Pradesh  140 48 82
Karnataka 109 84 76
Punjab 26 37 67
Haryana 103 84 67
Kerala 110 97 42
Maharashtra 76 51 41
Bihar 65 62 40
Tamil Nadu  53 44 39
Gujarat 48 39 31
West Bengal  64 46 29
Delhi 25 22 28
Orissa 45 20 23
Rajasthan 26 20 16
All India  79 56 52
 
 
6. The Big Picture 
In this section, we aim to substantiate using some rigor a key hypothesis of this paper, 
namely, that the variation in the net entry rates across states was greater in the nineties 
than in the eighties, on account of the greater economic federalism of the latter decade.  
Since we do not have information about the ex ante decision-making process of the firms’ 
management, we can, at best, infer state-level differences in business environment, that 
presumably drives the choice of location in a liberalized era, from the ex post differences 
in the performance of production units across states. Our broad empirical strategy, 
therefore, is to check whether location had greater influence on our measures of firm 
performance in the nineties than in the eighties, after controlling for appropriate plant-
level factors, and whether there is a significant variation in the impact of location on 
performance.  
 
Thus far we have discussed net entry patterns across 15 major states in India. In this 
section, however, we shall look at only 14 of these states. We shall leave Delhi out of our 
sample, partly because there has been a concerted movement by the citizens and the  36
courts to relocate factories outside of city limits, on environmental grounds, and partly 
because, on account of overlaps of interests between Delhi’s state government and the 
national government that is seated in Delhi, the former does not enjoy the same powers as 
other state governments.  
 
Our measure of performance is the value of output per worker. In Columns 1, 3 and 5 of 
Table 19, we report the regression estimates for the model explaining cross-sectional 
variation in labor productivity in 1989-90, for textile units, electrical machinery units, 
and all other units. Stylized literature suggests that it depends on factors like the size of 
operations, type of technology (i.e., capital intensiveness), and age of the plant and 
machinery. In addition to these, we also include in the specification a dummy variable 
that takes the value 1 if a plant is de novo, i.e., post-1984 for the 1989-90 sample. The 
adjusted R-square values of 0.45 for textile units and 0.59 for electrical machinery units 
suggest that our empirical specification fits the data reasonably well.  
 
For all the three sub-samples, we carried out the following procedure: First, we estimated 
a regression model that included all the plant-level variables, as well as dummy variables 
for 13 states. Andhra Pradesh (APR) was the omitted category/state. The first set of 
estimates told us whether or not an included state is no different from Andhra Pradesh, or 
whether it is better than or worse than Andhra in terms of its impact of plant-level labor 
productivity. Next, we re-estimated the model using samples from groups of states that 
are not statistically different from each other, to ensure that these states are indeed similar 
such that within these samples of similar states the state dummy variables did not have 
any significant impact on plant-level labor productivity. In the final analysis, the groups 
were as follows: (1) Andhra Pradesh (APR), Kerala (KER), Madhya Pradesh (MPR), 
Orissa (ORI) and Uttar Pradesh (UPR); (2) Bihar (BIH), Karnataka (KAR) and 
(surprisingly!) Tamil Nadu (TND); and (3) Gujarat (GUJ) and Maharashtra (MAH) 
Haryana (HAR), Punjab (PUN), Rajasthan (RAJ) and West Bengal (WBL) could not be 
clubbed together with other states.   37
Table 19 
Impact of Location on Plant Performance 
 
Dependent variable: Labor productivity 
 
Others   
Textiles 
 
Electrical Machinery  All Size  Small  Large 
1989-90  2000-01  1989-90 2000-01 1989-90  2000-01 1989-90 2000-01 1989-90 2000-01 
 
(1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) 
AGE  - 0.17 *** 
  (0.03) 
- 0.14 ** 
  (0.05) 
- 0.16 *** 
  (0.03) 
- 0.11 * 
  (0.07) 
- 0.08 *** 
  (0.01) 
- 0.01 
  (0.01) 
- 0.01 
  ((0.01) 
  0.07 *** 
  (0.01) 
- 0.15 *** 
  (0.03) 
- 0.22 *** 
  (0.03) 
KLRATIO    0.09 *** 
  (0.01) 
  0.14 *** 
  (0.02) 
  0.11 *** 
  (0.01) 
  0.14 *** 
  (0.02) 
  0.16 *** 
  (0.00) 
  0.23 *** 
  (0.00) 
  0.21 *** 
  (0.00) 
  0.30 *** 
  (0.00) 
  0.29 *** 
  (0.01) 
  0.11 *** 
  (0.01) 
SALES    0.42 *** 
  (0.01) 
  0.42 *** 
  (0.02) 
  0.44 *** 
  (0.01) 
  0.39 *** 
  (0.02) 
  0.46 *** 
  (0.00) 
  0.39 *** 
  (0.00) 
  0.57 *** 
  (0.00) 
  0.47 *** 
  (0.00) 
  0.46 *** 
  (0.01) 
  0.49 *** 
  (0.01) 
DENOVO  - 0.16 ** 
  (0.06) 
  0.06 
  (0.08) 
- 0.12 * 
  (0.06) 
- 0.03 
  (0.11) 
- 0.07 *** 
  (0.02) 
  0.01 
  (0.02) 
- 0.03 * 
  (0.02) 
  0.03 
  (0.02) 
- 0.15 ** 
  (0.06) 
- 0.06 
  (0.05) 
State Group 1    4.31 *** 
  (0.21) 
  4.39 *** 
  (0.32) 
  4.27 *** 
  (0.21) 
  5.53 *** 
  (0.38) 
  3.06 *** 
  (0.06) 
  4.19 *** 
  (0.08) 
  0.94 *** 
  (0.07) 
  2.09 *** 
  (0.11) 
  1.08 *** 
  (0.34) 
  4.05 *** 
  (0.25) 
State Group 2    0.02 
  (0.04) 
  0.16 ** 
  (0.06) 
  0.04 
  (0.05) 
  0.08 
  (0.09) 
- 0.07 *** 
  (0.01) 
- 0.23 *** 
  (0.02) 
- 0.06 *** 
  (0.01) 
- 0.27 *** 
  (0.02) 
  0.08 * 
  (0.04) 
- 0.08 * 
  (0.04) 
State Group 3    0.38 *** 
  (0.06) 
  0.03 
  (0.08) 
  0.25 *** 
  (0.04) 
  0.25 *** 
  (0.08) 
  0.28 *** 
  (0.01) 
  0.04 ** 
  (0.02) 
  0.27 *** 
  (0.01) 
  0.05 *** 
  (0.02) 
  0.29 *** 
  (0.03) 
- 0.06 * 
  (0.03) 
State Group 4    0.33 *** 
  (0.09) 
  0.42 *** 
  (0.11) 
  0.13 
  (0.11) 
  0.18 
  (0.12) 
  0.22 *** 
  (0.02) 
  0.20 *** 
  (0.03) 
  0.21 *** 
  (0.02) 
  0.18 *** 
  (0.03) 
  0.04 
  (0.06) 
  0.01 
  (0.06) 
State Group 5    0.73 *** 
  (0.06) 
  0.69 *** 
  (0.09) 
  0.06 
  (0.08) 
  0.15 
  (0.17) 
  0.44 *** 
  (0.02) 
  0.27 *** 
  (0.02) 
  0.39 *** 
  (0.02) 
  0.24 *** 
  (0.02) 
  0.10 
  (0.07) 
- 0.05 
  (0.07) 
State Group 6    0.44 *** 
  (0.07) 
  0.42 *** 
  (0.12) 
  0.32 *** 
  (0.10) 
  0.29 * 
  (0.17) 
  0.25 *** 
  (0.03) 
  0.23 *** 
  (0.03) 
  0.23 *** 
  (0.03) 
  0.17 *** 
  (0.03) 
- 0.10 
  (0.11) 
  0.05 
  (0.09) 
State Group 7    0.08 
  (0.12) 
- 0.21 
  (0.18) 
  0.14 * 
  (0.07) 
  0.17 
  (0.12) 
  0.25 *** 
  (0.02) 
  0.08 ** 
  (0.03) 
  0.28 *** 
  (0.02) 
  0.13 *** 
  (0.03) 
- 0.10 
  (0.08) 
- 0.07 
  (0.09) 
Industry    Yes      Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes 
 
F-statistics 
(Prob > F-stat) 
  185.16 
  (0.00) 
  108.36 
  (0.00) 
  211.62 
  (0.00) 
  64.10 
  (0.00) 
  2601.03 
  (0.00) 
  1793.63 
  (0.00) 
  2751.94 
  (0.00) 
  1339.39 
  (0.00) 
  180.11 
  (0.00) 
  234.87 
  (0.00) 
Adjusted R-sq    0.45    0.49    0.59    0.60    0.61    0.59    0.64    0.62    0.55    0.58 
No. of obs.    3482    1989    1977    709    26097    16564    23221    13228    2876    3336  38
Variable descriptions: AGE       Log of age in years 
   KLRATIO   Log  of  capital-labor  ratio 
   SALES  Log  of  sales 
   DENOVO   Dummy=1  for  1989-90 regression if plant was 
established after 1984 
      Dummy=1  for  2000-01  regression  if  plant  was 
established after 1991 
   State  Group  1   Kerala,  Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Uttar Pradesh 
   State  Group  2   Bihar,  Karnataka,  Tamil  Nadu 
   State  Group  3   Gujarat,  Maharashtra 
   State  Group  4   Haryana 
   State  Group  5   Punjab 
   State  Group  6   Rajasthan 
   State  Group  7   West  Bengal 
   Industry   Controls  for  2-digit  industries 
 
Note:      The values within parentheses are standard errors. 
      ***, ** and * imply statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10 levels, 
respectively. 
 
These groupings along with the standalone states are not surprising. For example, the first group 
comprises of states (APR, KER, MPR, ORI and UPR) that are not very developed industrially. 
Similarly, Group 3 comprises of Gujarat and Maharashtra, two of the most industrially 
developed states. Among states that cannot be clubbed together with others, Rajasthan is unique 
because it has been able to rise above its traditional place alongside economic weaklings like 
Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, and has experienced remarkable growth during the nineties. At the 
other end of the spectrum, we have West Bengal that has had the same (communist) government 
since 1977, leading to a significant alteration in the balance between rural and urban 
development, and, hence between the agricultural and industrial sectors. Indeed the only 
challenge is reconciling the regression-induced “similarity” of among the states belonging to the 
second group: Bihar is an economic basket case, while Tamil Nadu is an economic powerhouse 
where a large number of traditional as well as sophisticated industries are located. 
 
The control variables in the regressions, by and large, have the expected signs: Labor 
productivity increases with capital-intensiveness of the plant and size as measured by sales.  39
Older plants that presumably have machinery of older vintage, on average, have lower 
productivity. The only anomaly is the relatively lower labor productivity of the de novo plants, 
raising questions as to whether the de novo dummy variable is effectively capturing the learning 
cost of new firms. This is likely to be especially true if the supply of (semi) skilled labor 
appropriate for the electrical machinery sector is relatively inelastic in the short run, and is 
organizationally embedded on account of factors like limited mobility across regions, such that 
learning-by-doing is the only way in which laborers at most de novo units can enhance their 
productivity. A literature that has developed largely in the context of multinational enterprises 
operating in emerging markets suggests that such learning cost can be fairly significant.  
 
In Columns 2, 4 and 6 of the table, we report the coefficient estimates for the same econometric 
models and sub-samples, but for 2000-01. To begin with, note that there was no change in the 
grouping of the states between 1989-90 and 2000-01, indicating that there is path dependence in 
the evolution of governance and business environment at the state level. It should also be noted 
that, in keeping with our prior, at least for electrical machinery, impact of location on labor 
productivity is significantly reduced in 2000-01 as compared with 1989-90. The most noticeable 
difference between the coefficient estimates for the aforementioned two years is that in 1989-90 
de novo units had lower labor productivity than the average unit, for all three sub-sample, while 
in 2000-01 the de novo production units in the textile and “other” sectors were more productive, 
and there was no significant difference in the labor productivity of the de novo and average units 
in the electrical machinery sector. This is consistent with both the literature on the performance 
of de novo firms (e.g., Bilsen and Konings, 1998) and the hypothesis that the reforms of the 
eighties were pro-incumbent while those of the nineties were pro-competition (i.e., pro-entrant). 
 
In Columns 7-8 and 9-10 we report the regression for small and large factories, respectively, in 
1989-90 and 2000-01. To begin with, the choice of an individual sector would reduce the degrees 
of freedom substantially. Further, while there was a significant increase in the extent of vertical 
integration among textile units during the eighties and nineties, the electrical machinery sector 
was experiencing rapid restructuring. In other words, choice of either of these individual sectors  40
may have yielded unusual results. We, therefore, report the coefficient estimates for the entire 
sample of production units. We argue that labor productivity in small units is likely to vary 
across states, but this is not likely to be the case for large unit. Small units usually cater to local 
(i.e., segmented) markets and, therefore, face little or no competition from units in other states. 
Hence, while productivity of units within a state may be similar on account of localized 
competition, there is no particular reason for the productivity of small units in different states to 
be similar to each other. This is true regardless of a regime that is more pro-entrant. Large units, 
on the other hand, sell in markets that go well beyond the state boundaries, and hence they face 
competition from units in other states. It can, therefore, be expected that in a pro-competition 
regime there will be convergence in the productivity of large units across states. The coefficient 
estimates reported in Tables 23 and 24 are in harmony with this conjecture; the productivity of 
small units in both years was state (or group of states) specific, but, for large units, location had a 
significant impact in 1989-90 but not in 2000-01. 
 
7. Conclusion 
India has witnessed major changes in economic policy since the mid eighties, and has experience 
a significant surge in economic growth since the early nineties. Upon reviewing the policy 
changes implemented during the eighties and the nineties, Rodrik and Subramaium have argued 
that the reforms of the eighties were pro-incumbent while those of the nineties were pro-
competition (i.e., pro-entrant). In this paper, we have examined the experiences of the textiles 
and the electrical machinery sectors in India to be able to take a view about the Rodrik and 
Subramaium hypothesis. We have also examined the hypothesis that, as a consequence of 
economic decentralization during the nineties, the quality of business environment and 
institutions at the state level affected firms’ performance and, hence, location decisions more 
during the nineties than during the eighties. Our analysis has involved the use of 3-digit industry 
level data on the number of production units located in the 15 most industrialized states in India, 
as well as plant-level ASI data for 1989-90 and 2000-01. The analysis finds evidence to support 
the hypotheses. 
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The policy implications for our findings are significant. The experiences of the textiles and the 
electrical machinery industries during the eighties and the nineties indicate that while profit 
maximizing firms respond to changes in policy environment in reasonably predictable ways, the 
industry-level outcome might be determined to a large extent by other factors such as the 
comparative advantage(s) of the economy that undertakes the policy changes. The textile 
industry, in which India indubitably has comparative advantage, witnessed significant 
restructuring in the form of vertical and horizontal integration to enable the firms to benefit from 
economies of scale and scope, once policies restricting such reorganization were abandoned. At 
the same time, the electrical machinery sector, for which the comparative advantage of India is 
not as obvious, experienced high levels of net entry, on average, between the mid eighties and 
the mid nineties, but has since experienced rapid net exit of plants. While some of the net exit 
may well be explained by so-called creative destruction, it is likely that import competition in the 
aftermath of reduced tariffs have precipitated or aggravated the process.  
 
A more important policy lesson, however, is that institutional factors that impact the strategic 
decision-making process of profit maximizing firms go well beyond factors like democracy and 
legal origin. The nature of the Parliamentary democracy and legal origin are common across 
Indian states. Further, during the eighties and the nineties, the ability of the states to differentiate 
themselves using fiscal incentives was limited. Each state had limited control over fiscal 
instruments in the form of sales tax and octroi levies on inter-state movements of goods, and 
their ability to use these taxes to any significant extent was restricted by fiscal compulsions. In 
other words, the state-level factors that influenced the decisions of firms to locate their plants in 
some states (e.g., Gujarat, Tamil Nadu) as opposed to others (e.g., Bihar) were possibly 
intangible factors like the quality of enforcement of law, policy continuity at the state level in the 
face of changes in state-level governments at regular intervals, and quality of governance in 
general.  
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 APPENDIX 1 
Indian States at the end of the 1990s 
 
    
 
States in our sample:  Andhra Pradesh (APR), Bihar (BIH), Delhi (DEL), Gujarat (GUJ), 
Haryana (HAR), Karnataka (KAR), Kerala (KER), Madhya Pradesh 
(MPR), Maharashtra (MAH), Orissa (ORI), Punjab (PUN), Rajasthan 
(RAJ), Tamil Nadu (TND), Uttar Pradesh (UPR), West Bengal (WBL)  45
APPENDIX 2 
Comparative Table of Indian States 
 
POPN  PCSGDP  PMANUF  DAYSLOST PCDEVEXP  PCINFREXP PRIMARY UPRIMARY
 
HOSPITALS
States  1980s  1990s  1980s 1990s  1980s 1990s 1980s 1990s 1980s 1990s  1980s  1990s 1982 1992 1982 1992 1982 1993
Andhra Pradesh  59  70  5407 7588 13 17 3337 1483 333 923  10  27 6630 6990 1310 1550 10.972 33.620
Bihar 76  92  2320 2386 6 6 1132 219 180 473  6  14 5680 4880 2300 2240 3.122 4.532
Delhi  7  11  13491 18996 18 18 386 91    N/A 611    N/A  50 2470 1740 780 800 9.470 12.326
Gujarat 37  44  7515 10783 27 33 891 635 413 1205  32  80 2760 3140 6180 6510 23.453 67.129
Haryana 14  18  8669 11594 19 22 490 366 445 1265  78  179 2970 2380 1060 1160 6.327 5.806
Karnataka 40  48  5698 8014 18 21 1318 335 329 1001  14  37 5080 4440 4830 5400 6.057 7.617
Kerala 27  30  5675 8022 13 13 1739 528 337 988  16  38 2140 2190 1470 1620 29.102 78.323
Madhya Pradesh  58  61  3908 5755 12 16 823 159 269 911  15  49 8060 8740 2550 3400 5.102 6.710
Maharashtra 69  84  7938 12065 28 29 6115 1582 419 1176  10  65 5170 5220 3450 3980 15.422 47.943
Orissa 28  33  4359 4782 12 14 284 98 258 730  9  28 9860 11490 3880 5640 11.207 10.470
Punjab 18  22  9991 12778 13 17 308 285 425 1249  52  118 6660 6040 1270 1120 14.716 12.572
Rajasthan 38  47  4999 7117 15 15 755 507 283 836  16  29 4950 5290 2220 2650 6.393 6.086
Tamil Nadu  52  58  6181 9392 34 30 3175 2354 354 1188  15  45 5360 5180 1670 1650 7.574 8.219
Uttar Pradesh  122  145  4193 5140 13 17 839 499 209 573  8  18 5190 4440 1780 1580 6.317 6.387
West Bengal  60  72  5345 7065 21 19 14191 3639 263 641  13  27 5880 6740 760 970 7.265 6.946
 
POPN    Average population (in millions) 
PCSGDP  Average per capita state GDP 
PMANUF  Average share of manufacturing sector in state GDP (percentage) 
DAYSLOST  Average man-days lost because of industrial action (per year) 
PCDEVEXP  Average per capita development expenditure 
PCINFREXP  Average per capita expenditure on transport and communication 
PRIMARY  Average number of primary schools per million people 
UPRIMARY  Average number of upper primary school per million people 
HOSPITALS  Average number of hospitals per million people 
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